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Orientations for Territorial Cooperation
Pierre Beckouche
Abstract Here we synthesise our ﬁndings with a view to address our key ques-
tions. First, are Europe and its neighbourhoods really “One Region”? Despite
regional integration through transport and energy networks, it has to be acknowl-
edged that there is rather “shallow” than “deep” regional integration and as a matter
of fact, rather regional de-integration than integration. Second, how can the
Europeans reduce risks and foster opportunities in their neighbourhoods? We
summarise several avenues for EU’s action: (i) promoting the territorial approach,
which is a competitive advantage for Europe in its neighbourhoods; (ii) ending its
dissymmetrical relationship with neighbours and a cooperation driven by aid;
(iii) focusing on a few key issues: mobility, energy, agriculture, water and envi-
ronment; (iv) promoting the Neighbourhood Policy (which is not sufﬁciently known
yet) and the notion of greater region (Europe + neighbourhoods); (v) reformulating
the neighbourhoods vision thanks to European policies cross-cutting. Our overar-
ching recommendation would be to design and implement, thanks to a tight
cooperation between Europe and its neighbours, a “Neighbourhoods Territorial
Agenda”, which would provide all public and private stakeholders with a shared
vision of our common region.
In March 2015, the European external action service and the European commission
launched a vast consultation “Towards a new European Neighbourhood Policy”
through a “joint consultation paper” (EEAS 2015) which certainly is the best paper
ever written by the Europe Union on the neighbourhood issue. It acknowledges that
the ENP has largely failed, and that instead of the desired “circle of friends”, this
area has turned into a circle of ﬁre. The authors of this atlas certainly do not believe
that a sole territorial approach to this issue could recover lost opportunities, and
solve the amount of problems and misunderstandings; but they are convinced that it
could be a part of the solution.
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7.1 Synthesis: Are We Really “One Region”?
7.1.1 Rather “Shallow” than “Deep” Regional Integration
We have seen the low international openness of the Western Balkans and of the
North African territories (except in northern Morocco) although their potential
accessibility to the European territory is high. This suggests important avenues for
territorial development there. As a whole, the neighbour countries have opened
their economy in the two last decades. Many of their territories are ready for
international connection and cooperation. Our analyses have stressed the strong
international openness of Istanbul, and, in the Eastern neighbourhood, Moscow’s
overarching dominance.
Nevertheless, European neighbourhoods remain peripheries of Europe. Relations
in investment, trade, transport and migration are characterised by imbalances in
many aspects. Europe is more important for neighbourhoods than the reverse.
Neighbour countries, except Turkey and Russia, play a minor role in the interna-
tional relations of European countries. The relation between neighbourhoods and
Europe is imbalanced in its nature: high level services and products with medium
and high technological content versus primary or low added value manufacturing
goods; tourist flows versus migratory flows including highly qualiﬁed labour.
7.1.2 Rather Regional De-integration than Integration
Europe’s influence upon its neighbours is declining. There are two main ways to
assess regional integration. The ﬁrst way is the structural analysis of the considered
countries: do neighbours more and more look like EU countries? Do they show
potential complementarities? The ITAN project brings some answers at
macro-regional, national and local scale. Demographic analysis displays clear
results. Young people of the greater European region are concentrated in the Near
East and North Africa. The elders are concentrated in Europe in a large sense,
Eastern neighbourhood included. This demographic shift is striking: poorly man-
aged, it could lead to conflicts between territories and perhaps countries confronted
by a difﬁcult transition, but, properly managed, it constitutes very favourable
complementarity. One thing is obvious: both aging Europe and booming
Mediterranean have to tackle high dependency ratios, in a context of insufﬁcient
jobs creation: this creates a de facto convergence of stakes. Moreover, as the
demographic transition is deeply advanced in all of these neighbour countries,
including the Arab countries, social structures and issues (“oldies boom” namely)
are converging with that of the EU. That being said, the second section has com-
pared the GDP per capita in the three major world regions; in the European region,
the gap remains huge between Europe and its developing neighbours.
The second way is the geography of international exchanges. Neighbourhoods
are important partners for Europe, reaching 7.5 % in trade of goods, 7 % of
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European air connections, absorbing 15 % of European development aid, providing
30 % of immigration towards Europe and providing one third of its energy supply.
Moreover, we assess at 11 % the share of neighbourhoods in the potential growth
market of Europe in the next decade. These ﬁgures nevertheless point to the
importance of neighbourhoods for energy supply and as a source of labour force (or
migratory threat depending on the perspective adopted) for Europe. This is com-
pliant with the neighbourhood policy which, to date, has focused on energy trade,
migration as well as in security matters. But neighbourhoods are hardly seen as
major economic partners. This concurs with our result in the ﬁeld of European
media: economic newspapers are much less interested in neighbourhood issue than
generalist newspapers, in particular in France and Spain; the ﬁrst thing that interests
European readers in the neighbourhoods is political instability. Obviously,
Europeans under-estimate the potential economic role of the neighbourhoods (be-
yond energy procurements), and still more under-estimate the role of the economy
in the political transition of the neighbour countries. Most ﬁgures in the second
section illustrate the impressive economic growth of all the neighbourhoods (in a
wider sense, the Middle East and Africa included) in the last decades. This is
undeniably a potential major asset for Europe.
Nevertheless they also demonstrate the declining importance of the EU in neigh-
bours’ flows: investment, trade, vessels movements, flight connections…. Another
strategic issue, that of energy procurement, tells the same story: since the Algerian
state has deliberately diversiﬁed the geography of its energy exports, Europe and the
US now each account for around 40 % of Algerian energy exports in recent years. The
reason is that the European Commission has given its preference to energy spot
markets rather than to long-term supply. In the gas sector, this means liqueﬁed gas
delivery rather than pipelines; and this means a rising possibility for Algeria to sell its
gas to the US, and lower opportunities for long-term industrial and technological
cooperation with Europe to build gas pipelines.
7.1.3 Regional Integration by Transport and Energy
Networks
The completion of networks on the scale of the greater region is a key issue for its
integration. The energy network is being completed little by little.
A Euro-Mediterranean electricity grid is about to be completed, but its capacity will
have to be increased if the Mediterranean Solar Plan comes into force. In the Eastern
neighbourhood, the energy network is far more complete; the issue here is the Russian
power over European Eastern neighbours, due to the absence of a European energy
policy. When it comes to transport, an important difference between transport net-
works in the EU and the neighbourhoods is transnational continuity. While there are
almost no barriers for crossing countries in the EU, many neighbours have borders
which are difﬁcult to cross. The number of persons able to get access to in a 3-h
time-span shows a great difference between western Europe and its outskirts. This
suggests avenues for further regional integration through transport networks.
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7.2 Reducing Risks and Fostering Opportunities
with Neighbours
7.2.1 Promoting the Territorial Approach Is a Competitive
Advantage for Europe in Its Neighbourhoods
The “Elements for a Common Strategic Framework 2014–2020” published by the
European Commission (2013) provides a starting point toward policy orientations
on the neighbourhoods. First because the text, in line with the recent re-orientation
of the ENP, acknowledges that the neighbourhoods need further subsidies, with a
substantial increase of the European Neighbourhood Instrument (which replaced the
ENPI in January 2014). The text also recommends a better combination of EU’s
ﬁnancial funds for cohesion, social, regional, rural and maritime policies. This is of
great signiﬁcance for territorial issues, which are, as such, transversal issues. The
territorial approach is very relevant when it comes to better articulate different funds
and sectoral approaches.
Seen from their neighbourhoods, European countries are envied for their level of
development and their genuine rule of law. But they are also seen as selﬁsh
countries, with double standards when it comes to applying their values elsewhere
than in Europe, with low political influence and as US-followers in military affairs.
Very few among the neighbouring populations know that the European countries
are main providers of funding for development, build common networks with
neighbour territories, have a major impact on a large array of actions: agriculture,
environmental norms, training cooperation, local investment, etc. The territorial
approach would help giving consistency to a wide set of European sectoral and
ﬁnancial actions which the neighbour local people are barely aware of. What is
visible, in these countries, is the rising influence of extra-European major players.
The territorial approach of cooperation for development is typically an area where
the proximity (geographic, cultural, linguistic) of Europe brings a decisive advan-
tage in the neighbourhoods vis-à-vis other global players.
Beneﬁting from this advantage would suppose giving concrete targets to European
funds dedicated to the neighbourhoods, in order to avoid the scattering and lowly
mobilising effects of the previous ones. The “Elements” text demands to “focus coop-
eration on key policy objectives”, which is good—but all ofﬁcial donors’ texts always
recommend that. The problem is that the text opens a wide range of possible targets:
human rights, fundamental freedoms, stronger growth, inclusive growth, economic
integration into the EU internal market, prevention of conflicts, sectoral cooperation
such as energy and climate change, support to civil society exchanges…We hope the
coming lines could contribute to the selection of a smaller number of key objectives.
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7.2.2 Ending with Dissymmetrical Relationship
and with a Cooperation Driven by Aid
Europe’s action on its neighbourhoods has long been characterised by:
1. an overhanging asymmetrical manner of designing and implementing politics,
whereas the ITAN report stresses on the future need for a partnership approach.
This is what the sections on the Mediterranean neighbourhood clearly state,
what the study of the Western Balkans shows, and this is what the on-going
crisis in Ukraine demonstrates: without a symmetrical solid (including energy)
partnership with Russia, no balanced European strategy vis-à-vis Ukraine is
feasible;
2. subsidies as the key mean to fulﬁl the ENP’s objectives. Yes, the neighbours
need subsidies to bridge the gap of basic infrastructure in the poor territories—of
which there are many. Yes, a country like Tunisia needs strategic immediate,
and very large, ﬁnancial support (promised by the Deauville Partnership) in
order to make its transition a success, because it would have a profound impact
in the other Arab neighbour countries, and so as to avoid the destabilisation by
Islamist foreign influence and by what will be long lasting Libyan unrest at the
gates of Europe. But other ﬁnancial means should be promoted by Europe, not
only because they could bring complementary resources but because they
suppose a renewed partnership, with:
– more Public Private Partnership;
– mobilisation of local savings: there is a lot a money even in “poor” neigh-
bour countries, and this money could be invested in local projects based on
local conﬁdence rather than in national banks in which the nationals do not
always trust;
– international funds including sovereign funds from Arab states for instance,
which suppose a way to label projects with a credible macro-regional
dimension;
– innovating funds, such as fees on Mediterranean maritime transit so as to
ﬁnd the necessary funding for sanitation in the Mediterranean partner
countries;
– higher importance of the productive system and participation of SMEs, so as
to cope with what is happening in North America and East Asia. A way to
promote it would be to dramatically enhance European granted loans as the
best ﬁnancial tool for territorial development in the neighbour economies.
Most of these countries have economic actors that ﬁt perfectly with loans
rather than with subsidies, yet EIB and EDRB’s granted loans are not suf-
ﬁcient, in particular in the Mediterranean neighbourhood because their
boards remain far from the Mediterranean culture, realities and needs.
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7.2.3 Focusing on a Few Key Issues: Mobility, Energy,
Agriculture, Water and Environment
The recent creation of the Partnership Instrument dedicated to supporting the
external dimension of internal policies is very relevant—not because of its (in
fact very limited) amount but because of what it implies on mind-sets. The envisaged
themes of the Partnership Instrument are good: competiveness, migration (indeed
nothing of the ENP’s goals will be really achieved as long as the Europeans retain
the old “migration” pattern instead of the “professional mobility” pattern), and what
the text relevantly calls “common major global challenges such as energy security,
climate change and environment”. This last chapter gives concrete ideas of possible
common (EU/neighbour countries) action in the ﬁeld of these global challenges.
Last but not least, the EU's Elements for a common strategic framework
(ESPON 2013) remind that Russia’s eligibility is retained in the new European
Neighbourhood Instrument. The chapters on the Western Balkans, the Northern and
the Eastern neighbourhoods have stressed the key role of Russia. This major
neighbour, which is reconstructing an area of control over some of its former Soviet
partners, has, at the same time, to be highly involved in the common regional
neighbourhood (as it has very positively begun to be in the Northern Dimension and
the Baltic Sea area), and to be kept at a distance in some speciﬁc sensitive issues.
Of course this is geopolitics—but the chapter on the Northern neighbourhood has
shown that neighbourhood issues are never far from Russian geopolitics. The
neighbourhood issue will not succeed as long as the EU has not taken the option of
behaving as a geopolitical player in its own region.
7.2.4 Promoting the ENP and the Notion of Greater Region
(Europe + Neighbourhoods)
Crossing the local Human Development Index and FDI inflows, we have shown
that many neighbour localities, mostly of the Mediterranean neighbourhood and
particularly in Egypt, show dynamism but are not very, or not at all attractive for
FDI. Over the three last decades, the European new member states have drastically
reoriented their economic links toward western Europe instead of the former Soviet
bloc; but the reverse is true for all the European neighbourhoods. Thus, we draw the
following lesson: EU membership is a driver to economic regional integration
whereas a neighbourhood status comes down to declining integration with Europe.
This calls for a reformulated ENP.
Some (rare) neighbour economies move from a peripheral position, mainly
selling primary goods, toward specialisation in low added-value manufacturing
goods: Turkey and Tunisia are the best examples. This means that economic
transition is possible, and that it is on-going in some of these countries. Europe
should strongly back this productive transformation, because it is a structural driver
for political and social transition.
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7.2.5 Reformulating the Neighbourhoods Vision Thanks
to European Policies Cross-Cutting
Several European policies should be further cross-cut with the Neighbourhood
Policy.
European Cohesion policy: the stake is to transfer to the neighbourhoods the
European know-how in the ﬁeld of territorial planning, regional policy and
cross-border cooperation. It is particularly important in the cases of Turkey and
Tunisia which happen to be the most unbalanced national territories, but not only
there. Among others, the Technical Assistance and Information Exchange instru-
ment (TAIEX) is an accurate tool for territorial cooperation in the following ﬁelds:
– the decentralisation issue, but also the state de-concentration issue as an indis-
pensable counterpart to decentralisation,
– the modernisation of the state and of the governance via local territories and
national planning, and the rising participation of local civil society,
– the role of territories in public-private cooperation,
– the rising importance of Geographic Indication in agriculture and of short supply
circuits,
– the promotion of decentralised cooperation; the need to better focus on neigh-
bour territories the European scattered decentralised cooperation,
– the promotion of international networks of territorial actors (e.g. ports, whose
networks are effective in the Baltic Sea Region but not in the Black Sea or the
Mediterranean Regions).
The reasons for cross-cutting Cohesion and Neighbourhood policies are many:
– The inclusive growth concern. It is a stake at many scales: locally because of the
poor quality of development, access to universal services such as water, and
popular participation in governance; at a national scale because regional dis-
parities are rising; at the scale of the greater European region where the dis-
continuities are not sustainable.
– The urbanisation concern. The Mediterranean neighbour countries are experi-
encing a rapid urbanisation process as well as an economic transition with
severe contrasts between developing areas and left behind territories.
– The minority concern. A major threat of the neighbourhoods is related to the
minority issue (Balanche 2012). Such concern is very difﬁcult to address by the
considered states, for sensitive political reasons. But a good territorial approach
could help. That is what the Moroccan state does through its regionalisation
policy, in particular in its southern regions, which helps with solving the
“Western Sahara” concern. Many exchanges of experiences, methods and tools
could be developed in the greater European region.
Common Agricultural Policy: the food security issue is one of the most sensitive
in the Mediterranean, thus a key aspect of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. Yet,
we saw that it has been poorly addressed, and that the perspective of a straight
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liberalisation of food trade could generate short-term proﬁt for European stake-
holders but long term threats for the entire region.
– Avenues for European cooperation stem from the CAP methods. They deal with
(i) encouraging more local food production; (ii) promoting rural development, in
the spirit of the “LEADER”methodology; (iii) promoting the Mediterranean diet
and developing geographic labels; (iv) re-allocating some production between
the North and the South of the Mediterranean (wheat would better grow on the
northern side, whereas three-quarters of Moroccan farmers grow wheat; fruits
would better grow on the southern side); (v) creating regional food security.
– Such regional food security would take advantage of embracing the greater
region, so as to beneﬁt from Ukrainian and Russian production. Food is
increasingly becoming a globalised product, with very long trading routes and
rising speculation on prices in global ﬁnancial areas. This is not socially,
ﬁnancially and environmentally sustainable. Food cannot be left to global
gamblers. Here, a clear commercial regional preference is at stake. This is the
overarching condition to promoting geographical labels, food quality and
security, protection of environment of local territories: could these collective
preferences not be set up at the scale of the greater European region? To
European stakeholders, this would guarantee the enormously rising markets of
the Mediterranean neighbours, whereas the latter buy their food from more and
more remote sellers, outside Europe. But the condition is to end with a part-
nership limited to free trade and to make a choice for an ambitious productive
partnership between Europe and its neighbours—that is, regional deep
integration.
Transport policy: increasing accessibility is a condition for regional integration
and market enlargement.
– All the chapters dealing with a neighbourhood regard transport as a bottleneck
for local development and better interaction with the EU. In the Northern
neighbourhood it is the very condition of development. In the Eastern neigh-
bourhood, the increase of economic exchanges with the EU is hampered by the
inadequacy of border and transportation infrastructure; particularly difﬁcult are
the problems on the roads connecting central areas of Russia with the ports of
Baltic countries and Finland. In the Western Balkans bad transport infrastructure
and insufﬁcient internal transnational cooperation lower these countries’ inter-
national openness. In the Mediterranean the Euromed Transport Forum had
conducted a very good regional transport action plan, but its capacity to improve
transnational facilities seems to be declining. For all these reasons, the TEN-T
policy should adopt further reactivation towards the neighbourhoods.
– Another reason is to be put forward. Transport is typically a long term per-
spective. It appears that all the neighbours, to a different degree, are lacking long
term vision. A perspective of a common transport (and energy) network would
spread the culture and the practice of forecasting in these countries, instead of
the prevailing short term approach.
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Energy policy: the potential for energy collaboration in the region is enormous. It
could be the basis of an ambitious social (employment), industrial, technological
and environmental partnership.
– The European Union is barely managing to reduce its dependence upon Russia.
Russia is developing new pipelines to bypass Ukraine, which would secure
stability of energy exports to the EU and avoid dependence on transit countries,
but it also weakens Ukraine.
– The huge rise of energy demand in the Southern neighbourhood could be a
fantastic opportunity for European enterprises, but it could also be a threat if this
boom is managed with low energy efﬁciency and high greenhouse gas emis-
sions, and if extra-European players take advantage of these booming markets.
– This has also a territorial side: the electricity grids are to be major infrastructures
for the coming years; in particular, rural development will not be possible if
these territories are not provided with electricity supply. When it comes to gas,
the Algerian, but also its neighbours’ territorial future will not be the same if
Algeria develops liqueﬁed gas facilities, or gas pipelines; the type of partnership
that Europe will choose with Algeria will have long-term territorial
consequences.
– In all neighbourhoods, addressing these territorial energy issues requires a
European energy policy to be set up. Its scope should immediately take the
neighbourhoods into account, which would make things easier because several
neighbours are energy producers. Such an ambitious prospect will never come
into force if Europe keeps a merely trading approach to the energy issue.
Environment policy: issues are much diversiﬁed in such a vast area—climate
change, floods and droughts, pollution, energy transition…
– It is impossible to address the neighbourhood issue if one does not take into
account the environmental dimension; it is impossible to address the European
environment issue if one does not take into account the neighbourhoods.
Pollution is about contiguity: here, proximity—that is to say neighbourhood—is
highly relevant.
– The numerous earthquakes in the Mediterranean and the historic tsunamis prove
that it remains at stake. This calls for a cooperation between Europe and its
neighbours (which has largely begun, for instance between Greece and Turkey) in
the three domains of (i) common alert system, training and exchanges of expe-
riences; (ii) actual concerted crisis management; (iii) post-crisis reconstruction.
– Climate change will highly impact the neighbourhoods, especially in the
Northern neighbourhood, in the Black Sea area and in the Mediterranean. The
water shortage will particularly impact Egypt. Today, the water resources per
capita are worrisome in the Mediterranean as a whole, especially in the South
but also in Spain: the water issue is not only a neighbour concern.
– The coming ENP should pay great attention to the water issue. It is not only an
environmental stake. It is also about management, since know-how is lacking in
both governance and technical aspects. It is political, since the modernisation of
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the water service would need an increase of water tariffs that neighbour gov-
ernments can hardly assume. It is ﬁnancial, since the need for modernisation of
the water and above all of the sanitation infrastructure remains huge. It is social,
since many neighbours are lacking a sufﬁcient water and sanitation service.
Water is the best example of indispensable cross-cutting policies, and of rele-
vance of the territorial approach.
A policy that would not be dedicated to “migration” but to “mobility”: this is
another issue encountered in all the neighbourhoods. Replacing the “migration”
pattern (driven by administrative concern) by the “professional mobility” pattern
(driven by economic growth) could follow the path of:
– visa-free cross-(EU) border movement between labelled persons (e.g. profes-
sionals belonging to Euro-Mediterranean networks recognized by the EU) and
local communities (e.g. nationals of neighbour countries in the Western
Balkans), so as to contribute to economic and cultural exchanges
– visa-free cross-(EU) border movement between labelled professionals, for
example people who belong to transnational professional networks recognised
by European bodies (Euromed Postal, business organisations…)
– win-win brain gain between the neighbours and Europe, so as to avoid losing
skilled workers who believe that they are better welcomed in Canada, in the US
and now in the large emerging countries than in Europe. Given the growing role
of diasporas in the economy and culture, it is important for European public
opinion and politicians to consider migrants in a renewed way: they used to be
all too often regarded as a social problem (integration, education…), they should
rather be regarded as a solution now that their education level is raising. The
people who live in western Europe as foreigners increasingly come from the
neighbourhoods, namely the Mediterranean one, and from Sub-Saharan Africa
which is a lengthening of the European area of influence. This is an asset to rely
on, given the foreseen development of Africa in the coming century—which for
the moment mostly beneﬁts world players other than Europe.
7.3 Towards a “Neighbourhoods Territorial Agenda”
The EU has hitherto ﬁnanced a large number of studies and programmes in the
neighbour countries, but a global vision is lacking. A territorially integrated per-
spective could add value to these scattered initiatives on trade, transport, energy,
agriculture, environment, etc. It could be a relevant tool for cooperation, driving




A Neighbourhoods Territorial Agenda (NTA) would meet several needs:
– a need for up-to-date territorial multi-actors multi-scale governance, because
most of the stakes have, at the same time, a macro-regional, a national and a local
scale. A macro-regional territorial scheme ﬁts with the wide vision enhanced by
the UfM, the Northern Dimension or the EaP. A vision of territorial stakes and
structural projects is one of the rare issues that could be shared by the various
regional bodies such as the OSCE, the League of Arab States, the Organisation of
the Islamic Conference, the African Union. When it comes to the local scale, it is
the relevant one in the ﬁeld of local essential services such as access to water and
sanitation, education and health. A spatial vision and good practices for territorial
development can be shared and exchanged; who could believe that such sharing
could easily occur in the ﬁelds of religion, culture or politics?
– A need for a cross-cutting approach of the various European projects and
funds, and a need for better interaction between policies dedicated to the EU’s
territory/and those dedicated to neighbours in order to support the external
dimension of EU internal policies, as has been said above.
– For each non-EU country a need (i) to design a long term vision (since territorial
development necessarily means long term) instead of usual short-termism, and
(ii) to improve coordination between the various public producers of data on
local territories (a national prerogative for sure, but which can sometimes be
better implemented in the framework of an international cooperation).
7.3.2 What?
The contents could be:
• Territorial policies in non-EU countries common to, or derived from, EU
policies
The region needs a synthetic view of all policies launched by the EU and each of
its member states, which have a signiﬁcant impact on the neighbour territories.
Nowhere, except maybe in the ﬁeld of Mediterranean transport thanks to the
Euromed Transport Forum, are the policies of France, Spain, Germany etc.
analysed through their territorial impact in the neighbourhoods. Even at the
EU’s level, for the moment it is difﬁcult to know how much money, according
to what policies, in which precise territory, the different European bodies have
spent in the neighbourhoods.
• Infrastructural projects so as to facilitate exchanges and thus regional
integration
This would be the central part of the Agenda. It would promote all projects of
interest for the greater region. If we take the case of transport, this is what the
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Euromed Transport Forum did for the Mediterranean. This work should be
reactivated, and further implemented for all the countries of the region. If we
take the example of water and sanitation, the NTA should remind the main
common principles; the main projects of interest for the region should be
identiﬁed, labelled, ﬁnancially supported, mapped and widely released. Some of
these items already exist but not all of them, and they are scattered throughout a
large number of documents, web sites, databases, hardly released and never
cross-cut. Moreover, regional integration by key infrastructures ﬁts perfectly
with the necessary extension of the neighbourhoods’ scope in particular toward
sub-Saharan Africa.
• Common governance of common public goods
The quality of water of the common seas, the preservation of Northern
resources, civil protection issues related to natural and industrial hazards, and
other transnational common goods of key interest for the greater region’s ter-
ritories, would be the third piece of the Agenda. Such transnational common
governance would be in line with the strategy for a regional deep integration.
7.3.3 How?
– The Agenda has ﬁrst to be a shared process. This is the condition for further
ownership and visibility. Shared by whom? Figure 7.1 provides an overview,
and suggests possible multi-level governance. The main idea is that the process
should bring together bodies from the EU and from the partner countries.
Whatever the process timeline, the priority should be the participation of bodies
belonging to a signiﬁcant number of countries of the region, with parity between
EU and non-EU countries.
– When it comes to European stakeholders, “shared” also means shared by the
EU’s bodies and by member states. The new design of the ENP implies a much
better coordination between the EU and member states.
– The precondition of success is a common platform for territorial local data.
Without territorial comparable data, no shared vision of our common region can
emerge. Some research and operational projects have targeted territorial analysis of
this vast world region, but methods remain numerous, data heterogeneous and
ﬁndings scattered. A common tool for territorial data would meet two needs:
(i) helping coordinate the various projects dedicated to integrated territorial
geometries and databases of the greater region, (ii) steering collaborative work
between experts and decision makers on shared spatial tools for decision-making,
and build interfaces with territorial stakeholders.
This “Local Data Platform” would have following tasks: update territorial
delineations at the greater region scale; set up metadata models and sustainable
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local databases, compliant with EU databases, so as to ease integrated and
comparable territorial analyses; harmonise local data (harmonisation of indica-
tors’ deﬁnition, of spatial geometries, of temporal discrepancies) and dissemi-
nate them according to the open data approach.
The platform would respect two principles. The ﬁrst is participation of research
networks and public (national-international) bodies dedicated to territorial data
and analysis. The second is parity between EU and non-EU countries of the
region.
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. Territorial Agencies (stemming from VASAB, Black Sea Economic Cooperation BSEC, ...)
(e.g. Commit.of the Regions)
Partnership EU/ENCs bodies 
(e.g. CORLEAP, ARLEM...)
Fig. 7.1 Stakeholders of a neighbourhoods territorial agenda
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